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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Statutes of limitations, as their name suggests, limit the 
amount of time in which a plaintiff can bring a particular claim.  
Once the limitations period has expired, a plaintiff who has not 
already filed suit is ordinarily out of luck.  But statutes of 
limitations are subject to various carveouts and exceptions.   
 
Statutes of repose are statutes of limitations’ more 
severe cousins.  They “protect[] the defendant from an 
interminable threat” of a lawsuit by “creat[ing] an absolute bar 
on a defendant’s temporal liability.”  Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. 
v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2050 (2017) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (hereinafter “CalPERS”).  “[S]tatutes 
of repose pursue similar goals as do statutes of limitations 
(protecting defendants from defending against stale claims), 
but strike a stronger defendant-friendly balance.”  In re Exxon 
Mobil Corp. Sec. Litig., 500 F.3d 189, 199–200 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Thus statutes of repose are not as flexible as statutes of 
limitations.  See, e.g., CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2055 (holding 
that statutes of repose are not subject to equitable tolling). 
 
We must decide whether Rule 15(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides a carveout more 
commonly applied to statutes of limitations, also applies to 
statutes of repose.  We are persuaded that Rule 15(c) allows 
amendment of a pleading after the expiration of a repose period 




Rule’s “relation-back” doctrine leaves the legislatively 
mandated deadline intact and does not disturb any of the 
defendants’ vested rights to repose in this case.  We therefore 
affirm the District Court’s decision to allow amendment. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background  
 
We summarize the facts as alleged in the operative 
complaint.  Defendant Orrstown Bank, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of defendant Orrstown Financial Services, provides 
“community banking and bank[-]related services” in 
Pennsylvania and Maryland.  J.A. 478–79.  In March 2010, 
Orrstown Bank (collectively, with its officers and Orrstown 
Financial, the “Orrstown Defendants”) made a stock offering 
at $27 per share.  Plaintiff Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”) invested some of its 
pension funds in Orrstown stock during this offering.  SEPTA 
also purchased Orrstown stock on the open market after the 
March 2010 offering.  Defendant Sandler O’Neill & Partners, 
L.P. and Janney Montgomery Scott LLC (collectively, the 
“Underwriters”) underwrote the offering, and Defendant Smith 
Elliott Kearns & Company, LLC (the “Auditor”) served as the 
Orrstown Defendants’ independent auditor.   
 
From July 2011 to March 2012 the Orrstown 
Defendants made a series of disclosures concerning the Bank’s 
financial health.  According to SEPTA, the Orrstown 
Defendants revealed they had failed to identify impaired loans 
and otherwise misrepresented that the Bank was financially 
stable, resulting in material misrepresentations in its financial 




disclosure; by April 2012, the price had fallen from $27 to just 
$8.20 per share.   
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
SEPTA filed suit in federal court in May 2012, bringing 
claims against the Orrstown Defendants on behalf of two 
classes.  The first, the “Securities Act Class,” consisted of 
investors who purchased Orrstown stock “in connection with, 
or traceable to,” Orrstown’s Registration Statement for the 
March 2010 offering.  J.A. 119.  As the name suggests, SEPTA 
asserted claims on behalf of this class under Sections 11, 12(a), 
and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.  The second, the 
“Exchange Act Class,” consisted of investors who purchased 
Orrstown stock on the open market between March 2010 and 
October 2011.1  SEPTA asserted claims on behalf of this class 
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.   
1. First and Second Amended Complaints  
 
In March 2013, before the Orrstown Defendants moved 
for dismissal, SEPTA filed its First Amended Complaint.  
Defendants concede this complaint was timely filed.  It 
renewed SEPTA’s claims against the Orrstown Defendants and 
added both Securities Act and Exchange Act claims against the 
Underwriters and the Auditor.  The Orrstown Defendants, 
Underwriters, and Auditor (collectively, “Defendants”) then 
moved to dismiss the amended complaint in full for failure to 
meet pleading requirements, and the District Court granted the 
motion without prejudice.  The Court’s dismissal order 
 
1 SEPTA’s later complaints lengthened this time period to end 




provided that SEPTA could seek leave to file another amended 
complaint within thirty days.   
 
With the permission of the Court, SEPTA filed its 
Second Amended Complaint against Defendants in February 
2016, again asserting both Securities Act and Exchange Act 
claims on behalf of the two classes.  Unlike the First Amended 
Complaint, which cast its factual net more broadly, the Second 
Amended Complaint “focused exclusively on alleged 
materially false and/or misleading statements” the Orrstown 
Defendants made concerning their “internal controls over 
underwriting of loans, risk management, financial reporting[,] 
and compliance with banking regulations.”  J.A. 8 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Defendants again moved for 
dismissal. 
 
The Court granted the Orrstown Defendants’ motion in 
part and granted the Underwriters’ and Auditor’s motions in 
full.  As to the Orrstown Defendants, the Court dismissed all 
Securities Act claims but did not dismiss the Exchange Act 
claims except for a handful of individual Orrstown officers.2  
The Court also dismissed all claims against the Underwriters 
and the Auditor.  Thus the only remaining claims from the 
Second Amended Complaint were Exchange Act claims 
against certain Orrstown Defendants (including all institutional 
defendants and some individual officers).   
 
 
2 The Court dismissed all claims against some individual 
Orrstown officers but retained Exchange Act claims against 
officers Thomas Quinn, Bradley Everly, and Jeffrey Embly (in 
addition to retaining Exchange Act claims against the 




The parties began discovery in January 2017, but 
shortly thereafter the Orrstown Defendants notified SEPTA of 
their intent to withhold certain documents containing 
confidential supervisory information.  This triggered a lengthy 
process in which the parties sought to have federal and state 
regulators review the relevant documents.  The parties 
ultimately moved to continue the case-management deadlines 
until the regulators finished their review, and the Court granted 
the motion. 
 
2. Third Amended Complaint 
In April 2019, SEPTA moved for leave to file a Third 
Amended Complaint.  According to the District Court, this 
complaint reasserted “previously dismissed” Securities Act 
and Exchange Act claims from the Second Amended 
Complaint, including claims against some parties who had 
previously enjoyed dismissal of all claims against them (the 
Underwriters, the Auditor, and certain individual Orrstown 
officers).  J.A. 14.  SEPTA argued it should be entitled to 
reinstitute the claims because it found further evidence to 
support them through discovery after the partial dismissal of 
the Second Amended Complaint.  Defendants countered that, 
among other things, the reasserted claims were time barred 
because SEPTA sought to file the Third Amended Complaint 
outside the three-year repose period for Securities Act claims 
and the five-year repose period for Exchange Act claims.  
Thus, Defendants argued, the Court should not grant leave to 
amend because amendment would be futile. 
 
The District Court granted SEPTA’s motion, 
concluding that amendment would not be futile 




Transp. Auth. v. Orrstown Fin. Servs., Inc., 335 F.R.D. 54, 82 
(M.D. Pa. 2020) (hereinafter “Orrstown”).  It observed that 
both applicable statutes of repose limit the time in which an 
“action” must be “brought.”  Id. at 79.  It further noted that 
SEPTA initially brought the action at issue (first in the First 
Amended Complaint, then in the Second Amended 
Complaint3) within the repose period.  Id. at 80.  The Court 
thus reasoned that for the statutes of repose to bar the reasserted 
claims in the Third Amended Complaint, SEPTA’s first action 
must have ended.  Id. at 81.  The Court looked to Rule 54(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that “any 
order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights 
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the 
action as to any of the claims or parties . . . .”  Id. at 80.  It 
reasoned that, under this Rule, its dismissal of the Second 
Amended Complaint did not decide all of SEPTA’s claims, and 
therefore the action did not end with that dismissal order.  Id. 
at 81.  It noted that, through the Third Amended Complaint, 
SEPTA only sought to “reassert the same claims against the 
same parties originally brought by way of the [First Amended 
Complaint],” which was filed within the repose period.  Id. 
(emphases in original).  The Court thus concluded that the 
statutes of repose did not bar SEPTA from using the Third 
 
3 The Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint in full but 
permitted SEPTA to file the Second Amended Complaint.  
And when it filed that Complaint, Defendants did not argue 
that the statutes of repose barred any of the claims despite the 
repose periods having expired.  Moreover, they conceded at 
oral argument that the Second Amended Complaint did not 
offend the relevant statutes of repose. As those statutes are not   
jurisdictional (see infra n.5), we presume that the Second 




Amended Complaint to assert previously dismissed claims 
and, accordingly, granted SEPTA leave to file the Third 
Amended Complaint.  Id. at 82.  But Rule 15(c), described 
below, did not apply, according to the Court, because the Rule 
concerned only the addition of an entirely new party or claim 
and SEPTA only sought to reassert previously dismissed 
claims.  Id.   
 
Defendants then moved for the District Court to certify 
its order for interlocutory appeal.  It granted the motion, and 
this appeal followed.  We later granted Defendants’ request to 
appeal the Court’s order.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a) (Securities Act) and 
78aa(a) (Exchange Act).  We have appellate jurisdiction over 
this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  The 
District Court framed the issue on appeal as: 
Do previously[] dismissed 
Securities and Exchange Act 
claims in this multi-party, multi-
claim action remain subject to 
amendment pursuant to the 
provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b), or did the 
previous dismissal of those claims 
end the “action” with regard to 
those claims, such that any future 
amendment of those claims would 





J.A. 64–65.   
 
On appeal, we may address “any issue fairly included 
within the certified order because it is the order that is 
appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the 
district court.”  Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 245 (3d Cir. 
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This appeal presents 
a purely legal question that we review de novo.  See James v. 
City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012).  
 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 embodies a liberal 
approach to pleading.”  Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 
202 (3d Cir. 2006).  Consistent with this approach, the relation-
back doctrine under Rule 15(c) allows a court to treat a later-
filed amended pleading as if it had been filed at the time of the 
initial pleading.  Specifically, Rule 15(c) provides that an 
amended pleading “relates back to the date” of the initial 
pleading when, among other things, “the amendment asserts a 
claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original 
pleading.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).  The Rule thus 
“embodie[s]” a “clear preference . . . for merits-based decision 
making.”  T Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of Wilmington, 913 F.3d 
311, 328 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 
A. Rule 15 governs SEPTA’s amendment.  
 
Although the District Court concluded that Rule 15 did 
not apply in deciding to permit SEPTA’s amendment, we are 
persuaded otherwise.  In Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d 




the original claim with greater particularity or amplify the 
factual circumstances surrounding the pertinent conduct, 
transaction[,] or occurrence in the preceding pleading fall 
within Rule 15(c).”  We adopted the Bensel approach in later 
cases by applying Rule 15(c) to amendments that merely add 
more factual detail to existing claims.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Santarelli, 929 F.3d 95, 102–03 (3d Cir. 2019); T Mobile Ne. 
LLC, 913 F.3d at 328–29; see also United States v. Thomas, 
221 F.3d 430, 436 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding, pre-Bensel, that 
Rule 15(c) applied when a habeas petitioner sought to add only 
facts to his petition).  This approach aligns with that of the 
Supreme Court, as it has long applied the relation-back 
doctrine to amendments that “merely expand[] or amplif[y]” 
claims in the initial pleading.  Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn, 
241 U.S. 290, 293–94 (1916); see also Maty v. Grasselli Chem. 
Co., 303 U.S. 197, 197–99 (1938); 6A Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 1497 (3d ed. 2010 and Supp. 2021).4 
 
 
4 We acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit has a different view of 
this precise question.  In Crostley v. Lamar County, 717 F.3d 
410, 421 (5th Cir. 2013), the Court held that the relation-back 
doctrine did not apply when the plaintiffs sought to reassert 
claims against a previously dismissed defendant after the 
expiration of the limitations period.  It reasoned that the 
doctrine, which it viewed as an exception to the statute of 
limitations, did not apply because “the statute . . . had not 
elapsed” when the plaintffs initially filed suit against the 
defendant.  Id.  We do not adopt this approach, however, as it 





Rule 15(c) thus applies here as long as the Third 
Amended Complaint “restate[s] the original claim with greater 
particularity or amplif[ies] the factual circumstances 
surrounding the pertinent conduct.”  Bensel, 387 F.3d at 310.  
And the Third Amended Complaint does just that: It both 
restates claims with greater particularity and amplifies the 
factual circumstances surrounding the relevant conduct by 
adding significantly more factual detail to SEPTA’s existing 
claims.  In this context, the relation-back doctrine applies.  
 
B. Rule 15 permits relation back against statutes 
of repose. 
 
The key question before us, then, is whether Rule 15(c) 
permits amendment outside an otherwise-applicable repose 
period.  It is well established that Rule 15(c) permits amended 
pleadings to relate back past statutes of limitations such that an 
amendment filed outside the limitations period is deemed 
timely.  See generally 6A Wright, Miller, & Kane § 1497.  But 
both provisions here—the Securities Act’s three-year bar and 
the Exchange Act’s five-year bar—are statutes of repose.  
CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2049 (Securities Act); Exxon, 500 F.3d 
at 199–200 (Exchange Act).   
 
Those statutes “effect a legislative judgment that a 
defendant should be free from liability after the legislatively 
determined period of time.”  CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2049 
(quoting CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014)).  
Unlike statutes of limitations, which do not begin to run 
typically until all elements of the claim have occurred, 
“statutes of repose start upon the occurrence of a specific event 
and may expire before a plaintiff discovers he has been 




Exxon, 500 F.3d at 199.  One major difference between statutes 
of repose and statutes of limitations is that the former are not 
subject to equitable tolling.  CTS Corp., 573 U.S. at 10.  This 
is because the “unqualified nature” of statutes of repose 
“supersedes the courts’ residual authority and forecloses the 
extension of the statutory period based on equitable 
principles.”  CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2051.  Defendants thus 
argue that the “unqualified nature” of repose statutes 
categorically prohibits relation back and supersedes Rule 
15(c).   
 
At the outset, the rule Defendants propose would 
present enormous practical difficulties.  It would mean that a 
plaintiff could not make any changes—no matter how small—
to its complaint after expiration of the repose period.  
Moreover, no circuit court has squarely considered whether 
Rule 15(c) allows relation back past statutes of repose in this 
context.5  In the absence of circuit-level authority, Defendants 
 
5 The Ninth Circuit has spoken on this issue, though in a 
materially different context.  In Miguel v. Country Funding 
Corp., the plaintiff argued that its amended complaint, which 
added a defendant after the expiration of the applicable repose 
period, related back to the plaintiff’s initial, timely complaint.  
309 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other 
grounds by Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1100 
(9th Cir. 2018).  The Court concluded, among other things, that 
Rule 15(c) did not apply.  Id.  It first stated that statutes of 
repose are jurisdictional and that federal rules may not extend 
federal jurisdiction.  Id. at 1164–65.  Relying on those two 
premises, the Court reasoned that Rule 15(c) could not permit 




argue that relation back under Rule 15(c) is incompatible with 
the nature and purpose of statutes of repose.  They also contend 
 
jurisdiction when statutes of repose were absolute in declaring 
claims dead after a certain time.  Id. at 1165. 
 
Miguel does not squarely address the circumstances here 
because, unlike the plaintiff in Miguel, SEPTA is not seeking 
to add any additional defendants after the repose deadline.  
Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit later recognized, statutes of 
repose do not create a jurisdictional bar unless they clearly say 
so.  See McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 
1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by 
Hoang, 910 F.3d 1096; see also Musacchio v. United States, 
577 U.S. 237, 246 (2016) (“Statutes of limitations and other 
filing deadlines ordinarily are not jurisdictional.  We treat a 
time bar as jurisdictional only if Congress has clearly stated 
that it is.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Here, both statutes limit when an “action” or “right of action” 
may be “brought.”  15 U.S.C. § 77m (Securities Act); 28 
U.S.C. § 1658(b) (Exchange Act).  Although the statutes at 
issue “use[] mandatory language, [they do] not expressly refer 
to subject-matter jurisdiction or speak in jurisdictional terms.”  
Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 246.  And Defendants have not argued 
that the context or history of the text leads to a different result.  
See id.  The Eleventh Circuit has held that nearly identical 
language, prescribing when an “action may be commenced,” is 
not jurisdictional.  Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v. Preston, 873 
F.3d 877, 882 (11th Cir. 2017).  We join that Court in 
concluding that this “boilerplate” language does not create a 





that the Rules Enabling Act prevents us from applying relation 
back here.  For the reasons below, we disagree. 
 
1. Relation back is consistent with the 
nature of statutes of repose. 
First, Defendants argue that statutes of repose, by their 
nature, create a right to be “free from liability” after the repose 
period.  CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2049 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Such a statute “affect[s] the availability of the 
underlying right,” as “[t]hat right is no longer available on the 
expiration of the specified period of time.”  Lieberman v. 
Cambridge Partners, L.L.C., 432 F.3d 482, 490 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  It “admits of no exception 
and on its face creates a fixed bar against future liability.”  
CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2049.  Defendants assert that, because 
a statute of repose “extinguishe[s]” a claim upon expiration of 
the prescribed period, see Lieberman, 432 F.3d at 492, 
applying the relation-back doctrine in this context would create 
an exception that allows plaintiffs to revive their time-barred 
claims outside the repose period, something that is impossible. 
 
The repose statutes before us provide that an “action” or 
“right of action” may not be “brought” outside the repose 
period.  15 U.S.C. § 77m (Securities Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) 
(Exchange Act).  The parties do not dispute that SEPTA 
brought an action under both statutes against all Defendants—
by filing the First Amended Complaint—before the applicable 
repose periods expired.  Instead, Defendants argue that 
SEPTA’s previously dismissed claims were extinguished by 
the expiration of the repose period, even though the action 
continued.  Thus Defendants urge us to read the statutes to bar 




   
 We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has seemingly 
implied that “action” and “claim” may overlap in the context 
of statutes of limitations.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 
220–21 (2007).  And we ourselves have at times used the terms 
interchangeably.  See, e.g., Lieberman, 432 F.3d at 492 (“[W]e 
are dealing with claims extinguished by a statute of repose.”).  
But even if the statutes barred “claims” instead of “actions,” 
our conclusion would be the same here.  SEPTA brought both 
Securities Act and Exchange Act claims against all Defendants 
before the applicable repose periods expired.  For those claims 
to be barred, then, they had to end.  But under Rule 54(b), “any 
order” that decides “fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action 
as to any of the claims or parties.”  As the District Court had 
not decided all claims as to all parties at the time of the repose 
period’s expiration—with the exception discussed in note 3—
none of SEPTA’s claims in the action ended.  See In re 
Raytheon Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 99-12142-PBS, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25197, at *8 (D. Mass. May 21, 2003) (adopting nearly 
identical reasoning). 
 
 Defendants protest that Rule 54(b) governs when a 
decision is final for appellate purposes only.  But the text 
contains no such limit.  And no other circuit has concluded that 
the Rule is so limited.6  On this question we agree with the Fifth 
 
6 Defendants urge us to follow the Eighth Circuit’s lead in 
Curtis v. United Transportation Union, 648 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 
1981).  There the Court declined to apply Rule 54(b) in holding 
that a plaintiff could not reinstate claims against a previously 
dismissed defendant after the statute of limitations expired, 




Circuit in Crostley v. Lamar County, 717 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 
2013).  There, the District Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion 
to amend their complaint after the limitations period expired to 
reassert a claim against a previously dismissed defendant.  Id. 
at 418–19.  But the Fifth Circuit reversed, observing first that 
the plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against the defendant 
before the limitations period expired.  Id. at 421.  It went on to 
reason that, under Rule 54(b), the defendant’s dismissal “did 
‘not end the action’” as to that defendant because claims 
against another defendant were still pending.  Id. (quoting Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 54(b)).  Thus the expired statute of limitations did 
not bar the plaintiffs from reasserting the same claim against 
the previously dismissed defendant.7  Id. at 418–19, 21.   
 
another defendant.  Id. at 495.  At the outset, we disagree with 
Curtis’s ultimate conclusion; as we discuss next, Rule 54(b) 
does “create an exception to the usual rule” that a plaintiff may 
not revive dismissed claims after a statute of limitations or 
repose expires.  See id.  Moreover, Curtis declined to apply 
Rule 54(b) in large part because the plaintiff had voluntarily 
dismissed the defendant under Rule 41(a)(2).  See id. (“There 
was no ‘adjudication’ of rights as contemplated by Rule 54(b).  
It was merely a decision by [the] plaintiff to remove a party 
from the suit.”).  Here, however, the District Court ruled on the 
rights of the previously dismissed parties (and the merits of the 
previously dismissed claims).  Finally, Curtis framed the issue 
as whether “Rule 54(b) tolls the statute of limitations.”  Id. at 
494 (emphasis added).  As we explain later, we disagree that 
this circumstance presents a tolling issue when the plaintiff 
brings an action within the applicable repose period.  
 
7 The Court so held even though the District Court dismissed 





Crostley, of course, considered a statute of limitations 
rather than a statute of repose.  See id. at 419.  But as it did not 
rest on any features unique to statutes of limitations, we are 
persuaded that its logic applies here with equal force.  Thus, 
even if the statutes of repose before us extinguish “claims” 
instead of “actions,” that is not at odds with relation back in 
our case.  
 
Defendants counter, relying on Brennan v. Kulick, 407 
F.3d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 2005), that we should treat SEPTA’s 
previously dismissed claims as if they never existed for repose 
purposes.  But that reliance is misplaced.  In Brennan the 
District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s entire complaint after 
the relevant limitations period expired.  Id.  On appeal to us, 
we recognized “the general rule that a complaint that is 
subsequently dismissed without prejudice is treated for statute 
of limitations purposes as if it never existed.”  Id.  But here, 
with the exception discussed above in note 3, the District Court 
did not dismiss SEPTA’s entire complaint—it dismissed only 
some claims and some parties.  Brennan’s “general rule” 
therefore does not govern whether SEPTA’s previously 
dismissed claims count for statute of repose purposes.  Put 
differently, the District Court’s order in Brennan disposed of 
all claims and all parties and thus ended the action under Rule 
54(b).8  See also Hogan v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 16-cv-
 
agree, as Rule 54(b) does not distinguish between claims 
dismissed with or without prejudice. 
8 Brennan also distinguishes between “final” orders, after 
which a plaintiff may not revive an otherwise-barred claim, 
and “conditional orders,” after which a time bar does not arise.  




02611-RBJ, 2021 WL 1534602, at *7–8 (D. Colo. Apr. 16, 
2021) (declining to apply the relation-back doctrine when the 
Court had previously dismissed the timely filed complaint in 
its entirety).  That is not the case here. 
 
2. Relation back is consistent with the purpose of 
statutes of repose. 
Next, Defendants contend that the purpose of the 
relation-back doctrine conflicts with the purpose of statutes of 
repose.  The “touchstone” of the relation-back analysis is 
whether would-be defendants had “fair notice” of the claim 
within the limitations period.  Glover v. F.D.I.C., 698 F.3d 139, 
146 (3d Cir. 2012).  In contrast, “the purpose of a statute of 
repose is to give the defendant full protection after a certain 
time.”  CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2053.  Defendants argue that 
these purposes are incompatible because whether the defendant 
had notice of the suit or not, a statute of repose creates an 
absolute bar to liability after the deadline.  
 
We are again unpersuaded.  While we agree that a 
repose statute’s purpose is to give defendants protection after 
a certain amount of time, it does not defeat that purpose for a 
plaintiff to bring an action within the time allotted—even if the 
plaintiff later amends the precise form of its pleadings.  SEPTA 
brought its action initially within the applicable repose periods.  
And we reiterate that, under Rule 54(b), reinstatement of 
dismissed claims cannot constitute the filing of a new action 
 
Court’s partial dismissal was a conditional order only, as it 
could have been “revised at any time” before the Court decided 




until a court has decided all claims against all parties to the 
initial action. 
 
Defendants rely heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2049, to support that 
statutes of repose permit no exceptions.  CalPERS, however, 
does not help Defendants for two reasons.  First, the tolling at 
issue there would have been a true exception to the statute of 
repose, as it would have been an “extension of the statutory 
period” within which plaintiffs could file an action.  Id. at 2050.  
Here, however, the repose period stays intact; a plaintiff must 
still bring an action before the deadline.  Rule 15(c) merely 
gives plaintiffs a chance to alter the details of an already filed 
complaint.  See Chumney v. U.S. Repeating Arms Co., 196 
F.R.D. 419, 427 (M.D. Ala. 2000); In re Sharps Run Assocs., 
L.P., 157 B.R. 766, 785 (D.N.J. 1993); see also Kenneth 
DeCourcy Ferguson, Repose or Not? Informal Objections to 
Claims of Exemptions After Taylor v. Freeland, 50 Okla. L. 
Rev. 45, 85 (1997).  Second, CalPERS rested on the fact that 
the kind of tolling at issue there arose “from the equitable 
powers of courts.”  137 S. Ct. at 2051.  It suggested that the 
outcome might have been different were the tolling “mandated 
by the text of a statute or federal rule.”  Id. at 2052.  As relation 
back stems from a federal rule, rather than equity, CalPERS’s 
reasoning is of limited value here. 
 
Defendants also rely on CalPERS to argue that allowing 
relation back to circumvent statutes of repose would permit 
“limitless” filing of new claims.  See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 
2054.  But the structure of Rule 15 protects against that specter.  
Under Rule 15(a), a party may only amend its pleading once as 
of right shortly after filing.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).  All 




consent or the court’s leave.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).  True, 
a court must grant leave to amend under this provision “unless 
equitable considerations render it otherwise unjust.”  Arthur, 
434 F.3d at 204.  But it may deny leave to amend based on, 
among other things, “undue delay.”  Id.  And the analyses for 
subsection (a) and relation back under subsection (c) are 
independent of each other, meaning that a court may deny a 
motion for leave to amend even if the proposed amendment 
would, if filed, relate back.9  See id. at 202–04; see also Krupski 
 
9 Defendants also argue that this approach would “allow a 
plaintiff to circumvent the congressionally mandated discovery 
stay” in Securities and Exchange Act cases when a motion to 
dismiss is pending.  Defendants’ Br. at 31 n.9; see also 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B).  We disagree.  The 
purpose of the discovery stay is “to provide a filter at the 
earliest stage (the pleading stage) to screen out lawsuits that 
have no factual basis.”  In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 
1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
But that purpose is still served if a plaintiff amends its 
complaint after discovery has yielded more facts to support 
previously dismissed claims—at that point, the plaintiff’s suit 
presumably has some factual basis.  Had Defendants wished to 
seek a final judgment on SEPTA’s previously dismissed claims 
before discovery resumed, they could have done so under Rule 
54(b).  Moreover, the structure of Rule 15 again addresses 
Defendants’ concern, as a district court may deny leave to 
amend if amendment would prejudice the non-moving party.  
Arthur, 434 F.3d at 204.  Defendants in fact argued before the 
District Court that amendment here would prejudice them, in 
part because of the discovery stay, but the Court rejected that 




v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 553 (2010) 
(emphasizing that the two subsections are analytically 
distinct).  
 
Defendants further argue that Rule 15(c) expressly 
applies to statutes of limitations only.  But nothing in the text 
of the provision at issue here—Rule 15(c)(1) and subsection 
(B)—refers to statutes of limitations.  Subsection (A) of Rule 
15(c)(1), which is not relevant here, provides that the relation-
back doctrine applies if “the law that provides the applicable 
statute of limitations allows relation back.”  “[T]he absence of 
limiting language” in Rule 15(c)(1)(B), however, “indicates 
that it applies to statutes of limitations and repose alike.”  
United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 315 F.R.D. 56, 
64 (E.D. Va. 2016); accord Chumney, 196 F.R.D. at 427. 
 
One final note.  Though it seeks to expand its complaint 
with additional facts, SEPTA is not bringing any new legal 
claims or adding new parties that were not included in the First 
Amended Complaint.10  See Thomas, 221 F.3d at 436 n.4 
(concluding that a habeas petitioner did not “raise a new claim” 
by merely adding additional facts to his petition).  Thus our 
 
Defendants do not currently challenge this aspect of the 
Court’s decision, we will not disturb it. 
10 Defendants assert that some—though not all—of SEPTA’s 
new facts included distinct, new breaches of the Securities and 
Exchange Acts not included in previous complaints.  We 
decline to resolve this dispute now because, as we explain later, 
before us is the District Court’s decision under Rule 15(a) 
rather than Rule 15(c).  See infra n.12.  We leave the dispute, 
which falls under (c), for that Court to decide in the first 




holding today does not address whether an entirely new 
claim—one that the plaintiffs did not bring before—may relate 
back to skirt statutes of repose.  Similarly, we do not reach 
whether a plaintiff may use relation back in this context to add 
new parties.  We leave those tougher questions for another 
time. 
 
Rule 15(c) encourages courts to decide cases on the 
merits, rather than a technicality, if a plaintiff merely seeks to 
amend a timely filed complaint after the statutory deadline has 
expired.  While Defendants insist this principle conflicts with 
the protection from liability afforded by statutes of repose, we 
see no such conflict.  Moreover, district courts retain discretion 
to deny plaintiffs leave to amend outside the repose period if 
the circumstances of a particular case would make amendment 
unjust.  Thus statutes of repose themselves are no barrier to 
relation back under Rule 15(c) here. 
 
3. The Rules Enabling Act does not compel a 
different result. 
 
Beyond the statutes, Defendants also argue that 
allowing relation back to defeat statutes of repose would 
violate the Rules Enabling Act.  The Act prohibits any 
interpretation of federal rules of procedure that would 
“abridge, enlarge[,] or modify any substantive right.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2072(b).  We have held, consistent with other circuits, 
that statutes of repose create substantive rights that would be 
affected by allowing a plaintiff a “new cause[] of action” after 
the repose period has run.  Lieberman, 432 F.3d at 492; accord 
Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 109 
(2d Cir. 2013) (hereinafter “IndyMac”).  Defendants assert that 




modify their substantive rights to be free from liability once the 
repose periods expire. 
 
But statutes of repose do not bar liability for all time.  
That bar pops up, creating a vested right to repose, only on 
expiration of the repose period.  See Bryant v. United States, 
768 F.3d 1378, 1383 n.10 (11th Cir. 2014); Fencorp, Co. v. 
Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 933, 940–41 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Baughn v. Eli Lilly & Co., 356 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1173, 1177 
(D. Kan. 2005).  Further, the expiration of a repose period 
creates a vested right to be free from liability only as against 
those plaintiffs who do not have a pending action under the 
statute at that time.  This is because statutes of repose create a 
deadline for filing actions, rather than resolving them.  See CTS 
Corp., 573 U.S. at 8 (“A statute of repose . . . puts an outer limit 
on the right to bring a civil action.” (emphasis added)).  Thus 
a defendant does not have a vested right for repose as against a 
plaintiff who sues before the deadline as long as the plaintiff’s 
action is pending when the deadline expires.   
 
Returning to the Rules Enabling Act, it helps 
Defendants only insofar as they have a “substantive right” to a 
repose.  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).  But again, SEPTA’s Third 
Amended Complaint reasserts no more than the same claims, 
against the same parties, as the timely filed First Amended 
Complaint.  See Orrstown, 335 F.R.D. at 81.  Defendants had 
a vested right to repose against SEPTA if the action ended 
before the repose deadline, thus requiring SEPTA to bring a 
new action after the deadline expired.  Yet, under Rule 54(b), 
SEPTA’s action had not ended when the repose deadline 
passed because the District Court’s previous dismissal did not 
decide all claims as to all parties.  Thus none of the Defendants 




period expired, and the Rules Enabling Act’s protections for 
substantive rights do not apply here. 
 
Defendants nonetheless urge us to follow the Second 
Circuit’s reasoning in IndyMac, 721 F.3d 95.  The Court there 
stated that the Rules Enabling Act barred any interpretation of 
Rule 23 that would permit tolling of the Securities Act’s statute 
of repose.  Id. at 109.  Defendants urge us to adopt similar 
reasoning as to Rule 15(c): Because its relation-back doctrine 
would impermissibly modify Defendants’ right to repose, 
Defendants contend, the Rule cannot apply here.  Some in the 
Second Circuit have adopted this view, relying on IndyMac’s 
reasoning to conclude that the Rules Enabling Act also 
prohibits relation back against statutes of repose.  See, e.g., 
Barilli v. Sky Solar Holdings, Ltd., 389 F. Supp. 3d 232, 263–
64 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); F.D.I.C. v. First Horizon Asset Sec. Inc., 
291 F. Supp. 3d 364, 371–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
But IndyMac does not help Defendants for several 
reasons.  First, the decision by its own terms did not consider 
“whether Rule 15(c) allows ‘relation back’ of claims otherwise 
barred by a statute of repose.”  IndyMac, 721 F.3d at 110 n.18.  
Second, as we explained previously, tolling extends the repose 
period, while relation back keeps the repose period intact.  
Hence IndyMac’s reasoning does not apply here.  Third, 
IndyMac is factually distinguishable.  There, members of a 
putative class—who were not named parties—sought to 
intervene in an existing class action.  IndyMac, 721 F.3d at 103.  
The Court held that it would violate the Rules Enabling Act to 
permit putative plaintiffs either to “file a complaint or 
intervene.”  Id. at 109.  Both courses of conduct would have 
subjected defendants to liability to non-parties in the initial 
action.  See id. at 100–01.  But here SEPTA has been a party 




complaint or intervene in another action.  Rather, it merely 
seeks to amend its own timely filed complaint.11 
 
We acknowledge that several federal district courts 
have declined to permit relation back past statutes of repose.  
But those decisions rely on the premise that relation back 
would violate the defendants’ substantive rights in those 
circumstances.  See, e.g., De Vito v. Liquid Holdings Grp., Inc., 
Civ. No. 15-6969 (KM) (JBC), 2018 WL 6891832, at *24 
(D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2018); First Horizon Asset Sec. Inc., 291 F. 
Supp. 3d at 371–72, 374; In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & Erisa 
Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Resol. Tr. 
Corp. v. Olson, 768 F. Supp. 283, 285 (D. Ariz. 1991).  Several 
of these cases involved entirely new claims or parties that were 
added after the repose period expired.  See, e.g., De Vito, 2018 
WL 6891832, at *22; First Horizon Asset Sec. Inc., 291 F. 
Supp. 3d at 369; In re Lehman Bros., 799 F. Supp. 2d at 310.  
As we have explained, a defendant does not have a substantive 
right to repose when—as here—a plaintiff brings an action 
against the defendant containing the claims at issue within the 
repose period.   
 
In sum, relation back does not offend the Rules 
Enabling Act when a plaintiff merely seeks to amend a timely 
filed complaint without adding entirely new claims or parties.  
This is because a defendant does not have a vested right to 
repose as to a plaintiff who sues before the deadline so long as 
 
11 IndyMac also held that Rule 15(c) did not allow putative 
class members to relate back past the applicable statute of 
repose.  Id. at 110.  Yet we reiterate that the Court’s reasoning 
rested on the members not being parties to the suit before the 




the plaintiff’s action is pending.  As Defendants here had no 
substantive right to repose as to SEPTA, the Act does not help 
them. 
 
C. The District Court did not err in allowing 
SEPTA leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2).  
Having concluded that amendments may relate back to 
avoid statutes of repose, we turn to the ultimate question: 
whether the District Court erred in granting SEPTA leave to 
amend under Rule 15(a)(2).12  Defendants, as noted, argued 
before the District Court that the expiration of the repose 
periods would render SEPTA’s amendment futile.  But because 
relation back may make the pleading timely, amendment 
would not be futile—and Defendants do not argue on appeal 
that amendment would otherwise offend Rule 15(a).  Hence the 
District Court did not err in granting leave to amend. 
 
* * *         * 
 
Rule 15(c) embodies the view that plaintiffs should 
ordinarily have their day in court.  But the rule must 
nonetheless give way to a defendant’s right to rest easy after a 
legislatively determined time, especially when that time is set 
by a statute of repose.   
 
 
12 As the analyses for Rule 15(a) and (c) differ, see Krupski, 
560 U.S. at 553, and the District Court considered only whether 
to grant SEPTA leave to amend under (a), we do not reach 
whether each of SEPTA’s proposed amendments relates back 




Nevertheless, the right to repose cannot bar the 
courthouse doors if a defendant never had it.  Here, SEPTA 
brought an action under both the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act against all Defendants before the Acts’ 
deadlines.  Defendants therefore had no right to repose as long 
as SEPTA’s action was pending.  Moreover, the alternative 
approach would risk locking the doors to plaintiffs who wished 
to make even the smallest amendment to their timely filed 
complaints after a repose period expires.  Having found little 
support for this harsh stance in the statutes, the federal rules, or 
our case law, we decline to adopt it.  We accordingly affirm the 
District Court’s order granting SEPTA leave to amend. 
